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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-2(a)-3(j). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is taken from a Judgment by Judge David E. Roth, 
of the Second Judicial District Court, sitting without a jury, on 
March 31, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is a support order rendered by a responding court in a 
URESA action binding on a subsequent action to enforce the 
original support order? 
2. Can a support order be modified retroactively? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The case of Olqesby v. Oglesby, 510 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1973) is 
controlling in this case. The order of the Pennsylvania court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Debra Kammersell and subject 
matter jurisdiction to modify the Utah support order. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE URESA ORDER OF THE COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
DID NOT EQUATE TO A MODIFICATION OF THE 
ORIGINAL SUPPORT ORDER. 
Courts have addressed in different ways, the issue of what 
effect a URESA order has on a prior order. Some courts have 
held that a URESA order cannot modify a foreign support order. 
Others have held that a URESA order modifies foreign order only 
if it states so. 
In Oqlesby v. Oglesby, 510 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1973) we find the 
controlling law for the State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that a responding court order in a URESA action, which 
decreased a father's support obligationf "did not modify, vacate, 
reform or eliminate" a prior Utah decree. The Court determined 
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that full faith and credit need not be extended to the foreign 
order. Id. at 1107-08. 
In accord with the Olgesbv case, many courts in other 
jurisdictions have ruled that a responding URESA court can enter 
an order which will exist along with the original order but will 
not "nullify" or "supercede" it. Any payments made under one 
order will be credited to the other. 
In Foster v. Marshman, 611 P.2d 197 (Nev. 1980), the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that a Nevada URESA order did not modify a 
former California order, and that the husband's obedience in 
making payments under the URESA order and the wife's accepting 
the payment, did not waiver the wife's right to greater payments 
under the previous order. Any amount paid by the husband would 
only be credited against those paid on the former order. 
In Thompson v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D. 1985) the 
South Dakota Supreme Court held (under RURESA) that a court can 
make an independent, de novo support determination based on the 
circumstances presented. This new order does not modify the out-
of-state order and is prospective in effect only. Thus, two or 
more support orders may be outstanding and valid at the same time 
and payments on one would be credited to the other. 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has also ruled that a 
defendant can be credited for amounts paid under a URESA order 
but cannot claim a URESA modifies a previous order of another 
court. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245, 1246 (La. App. 
1982). 
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In M.v M., 438 N.E. 2d 1023 (Ind. App. 1982), the court 
determined that the section in URESA providing that no order 
issued by a responding court can "supercede" any other order 
(Sec. 30) meant that the initiating state, when calculating 
arrearages due under an original divorce decree, is not required 
to grant full faith and credit to a responding court order. 
Defendant relies upon the case of Sullivan v. Sullivan, 424 
N.E.2d 957 (111. App. 1981) wherein the court granted full faith 
and credit to a foreign modification of a prior support order. 
However, the court made it clear that the modification had . 
prospective effect only. The previous order as it applied to 
past due support installments was not affected. It should be 
pointed out that the court that ruled in Sullivan later ruled in 
a similar case that since a plaintiff (obligee) was not present 
at the responding state's hearing which resulted in a prospective 
modification of support, the responding court had no personal 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff. The responding order could not 
modify the initiating court's previous order. In Re Marriage of 
Gifford, 504 N.E.2d 812 (111. App. 1987). This ruling in Gifford 
was later modified by the Illinois Supreme Court. The court 
rejected the personal jurisdiction argument, rather it based its 
decision on subject matter jurisdiction grounds derived from the 
anti-suprecession section of the responding state's URESA 
(Section 30, the same section used by the responding state in the 
Oglesby case). The court stated that the responding order did 
not modify the Illinois decree but just set a new amount. The 
payments under the new amount could be credited to the initial 
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decree. The Illinois supreme Court stated that their holding 
seemed to be in accord with every jurisdiction which had analyzed 
the issue including Utah Oqlesby). In Re Marriage of Gifford, 
521 N.E.2d 929 (111. 1988). Therefore, although not specifically 
declaring it, the ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court in In Re 
Gifford may have essentially overturned Sullivan. 
Defendant pleads with the Court to determine that the 
factual situation in this case has never before been considered 
by this Court when applying the Oqlesby rationale. However, the 
principle of law resulting from Oqlesby can be applied to many 
fact situations. Defendant asserts in his statement of facts 
that the State of Utah took no action to enforce the original 
support order in Pennsylvania. That is not true. Following the 
entry of the decree of divorce, the defendant removed himself 
from the State of Utah. While it may be true that he commenced 
proceedings in Pennsylvania to modify is support obligation, it~ 
has not been shown that service of process was perfected. It 
should be apparent that the Pennsylvania courts lacked personal, 
or subject matter jurisdiction over Debra Kammersell. The 
Department of Social Services only became aware of the order of 
the Pennsylvania court upon which defendant relies after 
attempting to enforce the original support order. In December of 
1985, the State of Utah transmitted a URESA petition to 
Pennsylvania asking that their support order be enforced. (See 
Adendum). A hearing was had on June 4, 1986 (See Adendum) and 
again on October 7, 1987 (See Adendum) wherein attempts were made 
to enforce the Utah order of support. When it became apparent to 
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the defendant that the Department of Social Services was not of 
the opinion that his obligation as ordered by the court in Utah 
had been modified by the Pennsylvania court, he filed and served 
his petition to modify which is the subject of this appeal. 
In matters of divorce and support orders the court of 
original jurisdiction has continuing jurisdiction for purposes of 
modifying its order, as well as for purposes of enforcement of 
the same. Under the URESA compacts between various states, 
jurisdiction is provided to responding states for the purpose of 
enforcement of the same. URESA proceedings are in addition to 
and not a substitute for the jurisdiction of the initiating 
state. 
For the defendant to claim that the Pennsylvania order was a 
modification of the Utah order is in error. More correctly 
stated the Pennsylvania order was an order setting the parameters 
by which the State of Pennsylvania would allow enforcement of the 
Utah order of Support. There is no reference in the Pennsylvania 
order that its order was intended to "modify the Utah order" and 
such effect should not be given to the Pennsylvania order. 
II 
SUPPORT ORDERS CANNOT BE MODIFIED RETROACTIVELY 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken firmly on the issue of 
retroactive modification of a support order.- The leading case is 
Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977), and most subsequent 
cases on the issue cite to it. The Larsen court stated "in this 
jurisdiction alimony and support payments become unalterable when 
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they accrue; thereforef a periodic installment cannot be changed 
or modified after the installments have become due." ^ d. at 1079. 
In Bernard v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892f 894 (Utah 1981), the 
Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between retroactive 
and prospective modification. It stated, "while support payments 
become unalterable debts as they accrue and a periodic 
installment cannot be changed or modified after the installment 
has become duef the trial court may exercise its discretion in 
imposing a duty of support prospectively." See also Karren v. 
State Dept. of Social Services, 716 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1986) 
(only prospective modification of a support obligation is 
proper). 
The strongest statement on the issue is found in Carlson v. 
State Dept. of social Services, 722 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1986), 
where the court stated, "accrued child support installments are 
vested in the child and may not be retroactively modified." 
Judge David E. Roth of the Second Judicial District Court 
correctly applied the law of the State of Utah to this case in 
denying defendant's petition to give retroactive application to 
petition to modify. 
Defendant in is brief claims the District Court erred in not 
modifying the order of the court for the period of time during 
which his petition to modify was pending. U.C.A. 30-3-10.6(2) 
states" 
A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modification 
is pending, but only from the date notice of that 
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petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor 
is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the 
obligee is the petitioner. 
The defendant in his brief does not address this issue. At 
the time of hearing defendant at no time requested the court to 
give -application to his petition the provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-
10.6(2), Plaintiff is of the opinion that this statute provides 
the csrort with the discretion to give retroactive orders to the 
dat^ of notice to the appropriate party so as not to penalize an 
oblisf^r or obligee for any delay of the court. The defendant has 
not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the delay of the 
courtfc^  nor was there any delay. The defendant should have raised 
thait issue before the trial court and having failed to do so 
shawiMl be barred from raising the issue upon appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The case of Oqlesby v. Oqlesby, 510 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1973) 
contrails the issue in Utah, The Pennsylvania court lacked 
pergonal jurisdiction over the person of Debra Kammersell, and 
subject matter jurisdiction. Also in its order the Pennsylvania 
coirrt did not specify that this was a modification of the Utah 
ordeatr* The District Court was correct in denying full faith and 
credit to the URESA order issued by the Pennsylvania court. 
Furtherf Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10.6(2) provides the 
Distrriet Court to act upon its discretion when deciding to allow 
any Modification of an existing support order to date back to the 
date wherein the petition to modify was pending. The District 
Court: did not abuse this discretion nor is there any record that 
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at the time of hearing that defendant asked the court to allow 
application of the modification during the time period that his 
petition was pending. 
For the reasons stated herein plaintiff respectfully 
requests that decision of the District Court be sustained and 
that plaintiff be awarded their costs herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£ jXasf^p/E August, ,£989. 
/CHARD J? CULBERTSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Respondent to counsel for 
Defendant/Appellant at 2568 Washington Blvd., Ogdenf Utah 84401 
on this /(jtsiday of August, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
- 1 0 -
Common Pleas Court of the State of Pennsylvania 
Allegheny County 
Family Division; Court of Common Pleas; City-County Building, #610; 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
RE: Debbie D. Hall and 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Jeffrey S. Xammersell 
Our Civil Ho. 78817 
Your Index Ho. 
Dear Sir: 
Enclosed are three certified copies of the Petition, the Testimony 
and the Court's Certificate and other papers in the above entitled proceeding, 
for further action as provided by law (URESA). We request you file these 
papers in your Court and serve the respondent who it is believed resides 
within your jurisdiction at 52 Watson Blvd., Pittsburgh, PA. 
Please acknowledge receipt of these papers and address further 
correspondence to: 
L. M. PoVey, Investigator, T#05~^ 
Office of Recovery Services 
533 26th Street, Suite 201 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 627-0540 
When a respondent is placed under a Court order, would you please 
send a copy to the above address, and have checks made payable and sent to the 
following: 
Office of Recovery Services 
P.O. Box 15400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-9990 
Very truly yours, 
/ COUNTY A7T0B 
BY: 
<^SSSu :^ 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IX] This is an IV-D, Non-PA case and qualifies for Federal Financial 
Participation. 
Enc. Judge's certificate and two copies of same 
Verified petition and two copies of same 
Three copies of Utah Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
Page 1 of 15 
Pag* 2 of 15 
By: Robert D. Barclay 
Attorney for Petitioner 
533 26th Street, Suite 200 
Ofcden, Utah 84401 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Debbie D. Hall and 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
Jeffrey S. Kainmersell 
Respondent. 
P E T I T I O N 
F O R 
S U P P O R T 
Our Civil No. 78817 
Your Index No. 
1. The petition of Debbie D. Hall respectfully shows that she 
resides in the county of Weber, State of Utah. 
2. That your petitioner is the mother and the said respondent is 
the father of the following named dependent(s): 
Child 
Matthew 
Joshua 
Date of Birth 
09/28/77 
05/23/79 
Page 3 of 15 
3. The petitioner and said child(ren) are in need and are entitled 
to support from the respondent under the provisions of Utah Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, (Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-1, et seq.) a 
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof* 
4. That the respondent Jeffrey S. Karamersell, refused and neglected 
to provide fair and reasonable support for her dependents according to her 
means and earning capacity and is indebted to the petitioner in the amount of 
$5,240.00. 
5. That upon information and belief the respondent is now residing 
in the state of Pennsylvania, which state has enacted a law substantially 
similar and reciprocal to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act. 
6. Testimony in support of this petition is attached. 
7. That respondents indebtedness ^ totals five thousand two hundred 
forty dollars and no/100 ($5,240.00) which said amount is more fully described 
in Exhibit "C", a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference and by a Court Order, a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit WD M. 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays for judgment and reimbursement of 
support arrearages in the sum of $5,240.00, and, for an order for ongoing 
support directed to said respondent as shall be deemed fair and reasonable and 
for such other and further relief as the law provides. 
Dated this A S day of ^17fYl }&W'L J MA . 1985. 
-Pe4^ -tj oner 9 
I""if,in H ii in I III """in 
STATE Of UTAH ) 
) SB 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Debbie U Hull U1115 ui - a, deposes «u <— "hat she 1B the 
|i »l I hi oner h e r e i n and l* *• she hafc * *arf the foregoing , ^- «»ii and MOWS the 
contentB thereof arid f k » own nowledgf 
m a t t e r s t h e r e . s t a t e d ** and be] * * -* 
matt erfi ibi I I I«IMM I In HI I n lio 1 1 nc 
XY1IV^ML>: '., Dated t h i s 
> 1 my? w i s , 1985. 
Pstii: inner . . (/ 
SI JBSCRIBED AMD' SWORN t,i be fo re me t h i s
 m^_^,Aay of y[ frOft/frJli^, 19 jj?j£ 
NOTARY PUBLIC v ^ 1 
Residing, a t : ^u^>y^^ \ Jn*jJb 
My Commission Expires: 
• A f n / f r f T , ^ ^ 
5 o f 1 5 
I'll linlmi t: 1) B a r e ) nj 
Attorney for Petitioner 
533 26th Street, Sui tii 1200 
Ogdent Utah 84401 
AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF" UTAH 
Debbie D. Hall and 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, 
P e t in I I iinpi"B> 
i ! 
Jeffrey S. Kammersell 
Respondent„ 
Debbie D Hull, the petitioner herein, being duly sworn on oath, testifies 
as follows: 
I (J When and where were you married to the respondent? 
1 
2. Q. Ar e you still the spouse of the respondent? 
A . N o 
T E S T I H 0 N V O F 
111 IIillii i n II Ill I l l 
3 . ANSWER ONLI If CHILDREN FOR WHOM SUPPORT IS SOUGHT WERE 
BORN IN WEDLOCK. 
P a g e * of l") 
Q. C:l in in t'l'M i lames, age a and dates of b i r t h of the chi ld(ran) c f 
tliii respondent. 
A. Matthew 1! }ukfk o l d 0 9 / 2 8 / 1 " I 
Joshua 6 years old 05 /23 / PI 
Q Hi n I he ( l i i l d i i i i Jiving with junjf 
A Yes 
i, ANSWER OILY IF CHILDREN FOR WHOM SUPPORT IS SOUGHT WERE BORN OUT 
OF WEDLOCK, 
Q. Give the names, ages and date s of bir th of any children of •' 
respondent born,, out of wedlock 
A 
Q Die p a t e r n i t y nit t h e a b o v e "been j u d i c i a l l y I t ' t e ran Tied? 
A 
Q " 
A 1 II 
Qo If paternity "has not been determined by a coi irt, have j ou 
other evidence which would supplement your a 1 1 egation of 
paterni ty ? (Attac h such evidence. ) 
A. 
Whei i did respondent l a s t l i v e wj th yoi i? 
A. 
6 Q • When and how much 1 i as hit laat contribution for 
support? 
Il September 1 9 t li 985; 160.00 
Q. 11 t h e r e a complaint oi an o rde r for Biipport in any cuuri? 
If Bin name court and amount, and a t t a c h a copy of the order 
A . Weber County9 Utah; $150.00 per month p e r c h i l d 
8 . Q Where i s respondent now ] iv ing? (C i ty & S t a t e Only) 
il  I "I t t s b u r g h , Penns] 1 \ i ai li a 
° " Can you d e s c r i b e respondent? 
A . E y e s I i i i i 
n u i mi in I ' l l mi i in mi in 
l a c e 1 White 
Height ""?" 
Weight ," 11,1 I Lib. 
Date of B i r t h : February 27, 1955 
Si 11 44 2093 
Identifying Mint In 
10 Q What is respondents usual occupation? 
A. Unknown 
•j^ Q^ where is respondent employed and what is her salar y? 
A Unknown 
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12. To your knowledge9 does respondent have any addition ml 
Income? 
1 ' I Benefits 
13 (I Does respondent own any property? 
I I 1 1 in in Hi mi in mi in i ii in in 
111 • HI Q During the period covered by this petition, when and i 
has respondent paid for child support and how much is 
arrearage? 
Il See Exhi bi t f,CT 
1 Q How much do you require monthly for the support ~* *he 
child(ren)? 
1
 $300.00. Please note that we are now attempting to collect 
Debbie's ongoing support as well as arrearages owed to her. 
She is trying to stay off welfare and needs the full amount 
Mr. Kammersell is court ordered to pay The t;i me periods we 
are attempting to collect for her are not the same as what t: he 
State claimed while she was on welfare. 
rffV7?Q 
^p^^Wid^t ~ •/L 
SUBSCRIBED .AND SWORE to before me this £}b 
9 
xpires: Residing at: ^ 
-j\f>rWo^(9f7 
HQTA^Y PUBLIC » - /> , 
Form aw-pagi 5 0f e 
cu 
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
il I (in Agreement, made -JU.J clisi] c f -
Debbie Oriail _ _ hereinafter referred to as applicant, who Is the 
stodian of the dependant minor Child(ren) of S* 
hereinalH"! i P-IIIIIHI! ii as absent parent, ml Services Llrnl nl llllii bureau nl I I ilcl Support 
Enforcement, Utah State Department of Social Services, hereinafter referred to as the BuieHii 
Statement of consideration mutual promises and agreement as follows: 
1. hat the Bureau W H ma** pvery reasonable eft 
Establish paternity for a child borr ,/ vedlock through t ^mpeie^ iur sdiction. 
2. I t iaf It lis contract shall be limited to enforcement of child support only, issues of visitation, custody, or other 
II i tatters in a divorce will not be litigated by this office and may require applicant to secure separate counsel at 
applicant's expense 
3. I hatthe Bureau will provide services with nochargetotheapplicant. The Bureau reserves the right to charge fees 
for services, however the apphcar it will receive notification at least thirty days prior to any anticipated fees 
v , hat the applicant will send or deliver to the Bureau, any and all child support payments from »the absent pai ent 
which come into the applicant's possession from ar lother source during the time this contract is valid. If the 
applicant accepts any monies from the absent parent directly and the monies are not then paid to the Bureau, the 
applicant may forfeit his/her right to services. Applicant agrees to advise of payment or attempted payment 
5. That the applicant does hereby make, nominate, constitute and appoint the Bureau, as the applicant's true and 
lawful attorney in fact to do and act in applicants name, place and stead to perform the specific act of receiving 
and endorsing any and all drafts, checks, and money orders representing child support payments on applicant's 
behalf from the absent parent hereby ratifying all such acts and endorsements as if same had been performed by 
applicant. 
6. T hat the applicant will cooperate fully in this action by disclosing promptly all relevant information to aid the 
[Bureau in locating the absent parent and securing the payment(s). 
7. That the applicant has no pending action in any court or administrative agency to enforce child support. Applicant 
agrees not to begin enforcement of said support matters through any other attorney or agency during the 
pendency of this contract 
8 1 1 i a 111 i e B u i e a i i / i 11 f o i v\ a i d a! I (:: • a ) i i i e i 11 s i e c e i v e o a s s o o i i a s I: I i e a c c o 0 n 11 n g process iscompleted. 
9. 1 i iaf the applicant will notify the Bureau whei i his/her address changes 
10. I t lat the applicant fi ilt^ understands that during the pendency of this contract: the Bureau of Child Support 
Enforcement shall have complete responsibility for enforcement of support. Any negotiations or agreements 
made by the applicant without involvement of the Bureau of Child Support. Enforcement will void this contract and 
services mav be terminated 
This instrument contains the entire agreement between the parties and no statement, promise or inducement made by 
any party hereto, which is not contained in this written contract shall be valid or binding; and this contract may not be 
enlarged, modified, or altered except in writing, signed by the parties and endorsed thereon 
It is further agreed that the applicant may request termination of this contract by completion of a Child Support 
Services Contract Termination Request Form. The applicant understands that the Bureau may require continued 
enforcemerTi for a period of twelve months following such a request. (This is to allow time for resolution of pending 
actions and collection follow-up for initiated actions, prior to case closure.) 
I certify that the information provided in this application and contract is true and complete to the best of my 
knowledge. I understand that if 1 give false information sei vices may be terminated and I shall be subject to criminal 
penalties under the laws. 
Witness our hands the day-and year first written above. 
sty) Qtjqhh %£r~ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, tt<^ ^ V J ;av of OJLAJC^LAAJ:,, 19 as. 
Notary Pub lit 
My ^ ',• ipnission Ex i les 
* - & : 
'or more information or assistance cat! the Child Sunnnrt Sprvir.pt; tpam 
Page 
EXHIBIT " 
COMPUTATION OF ARREABAGES 
RE: Debbie D. Hall, and the 
STATE 07 UTAH vs. 
Jeffrey S. Kammersell 
CIVIL Ho. 
AMOUNT TOTAL AMOUNT AMOUNT 
MONTHS YEAR PER MONTH AMOUNT PAID ARREARS 
Sep-Dec 1982 $300.00 $1,200.00 $ 640.00 $ 560.00 
Jan-Feb 1983 300.00 600.00 320.00 280.00 
Jun-Dec 1983 300.00 2,100.00 1,120.00 980.00 
Jan-Dec 198A 300.00 3<600.00 1,740.00 1,860.00 
Jan-Oct 1985 300.00 3,000.00 1,400.00 1.560.00 
TOTAL $5,240.00 
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EXHIBIT "D 
ORDER FOR SUPPORT 
G * 0 / a s 
STITIE.S V. FARR o. 
\ttomrv« for PlaintlTI A : 
Lanber^er Souare. Building 1 * ^ ^ > ^ 
205 26th Street. Suite 34 ^ *^ |Jnu , . , • 
>den, Utah S^ .401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
I.! THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT CTJHT 07 :.1H^ OU!:7v 
STATU OF UTAH 
DECREE 0~ DIVORCE 
DEBRA D. KAMMER5ELL, / 
riaintiff, / ~~ 
jrrriSV S. KAMZRSELL, / Civil Mo. 78S17 
Defendant. / 
I":!!;" FLATTER cane on rerularlv for hearing on the 13th 
day of Mever.ber, 15£I, be.-ore the Honorable John F. Wahlauist. ore 
v: th* .sui.-er of the phove-entitlec Court, sittinr vithout a jur-, 
ar.^  the plaintiff amearinf* in person and beins represented hv 
David ?v. i'.anilton who appeared for Stephen V.\ Farr, attomev of 
record for plaintiff herein, and the defendant not appearinr in 
person, nor beinr represented bv counsel, and the default or the 
defendant havinc been duly entered in open court, and the 
plaintiff bein? sworn and testifvinr. in her own behalf, and the 
Court beins fullv advised in the premises, and having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav, separatelv stated in 
writing, and pood cause appearing therefore, now 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded an 
absolute Decree of Divorce free the defendant, same to become 
final 90 davs after signature and entry thereof. 
2. That the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the 
care, custody, and control of the minor children, and that the 
defendant be and he is hereby awarded reasonable richts of 
visitation at reasonable times and places. 
Z 
3. That the plaintiff be and she it herebv awarded the 
*un of S15!>.0C ner raonth ner child as and for child tuonort. 
4. That the plaintiff be and she is herebv awarded the 
sjt of $5/.01 per month at and for an alimony award herein. 
5. That the plaintiff be and she is herebv awarded the 
hone and real proDertv located at 816 East 1050 North, Ogden, 
Utah, subject to the indebtedness thereon. 
C. Tnat each party is herebv avrarded those items or 
Dro^erty currentiv in his or her Possession. 
7. That the nlaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to 
assune and discharge the amount due and o*:inr Or.den First Federal 
for the rcortrare on the fa-nilv home; and the defendant" be and he--"* 
l? hereby ordered to arsume and discharge all other debts and 
obligation.*- the parties ha\re incurred during the marriage, and 
hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
I. That the defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
naiiitsin health and accident insurance for the benefit of the 
ninor children. 
y. That the defendant be and he is hereby ordered tc 
assume and car plaintiff's attorney's fees of $350.00, rlus costs 
of court, incurred in the brincinc of this action. 
DATED this *? dav of November, 1981. 
v jKii: r . WAKLOIIIST ~ 
/ District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 0^ MAILINT-
I herebv certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and forefoinp Decree ox Divorce was nailed to defendant% 
Jeff re** S. Kazanersell, c/o 816 East 1050 North, Op.den, Utah S^bn*.
 k 
veszaze prepaid, this G2" cf November, 1951. 
Secretary 
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By: Robert D. Barclay 
Attorney for Petitioner 
533 26th Street, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AHD FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Debbie D. Hall and 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AHD THROUGH 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, 
Petitioners, 
Ve. 
Jeffrey S. Kammersell 
Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
Civil No. 78817 
88. 
I, Debbie D. Hall, do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty, I am 
unable to bear the expense of legal proceedings in which I am involved, and 
that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief sought by such legal 
proceedings. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ffinU day of A J Q 0fe/W.b^>»- &r. 
Hy Commission Expires: 
19. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / ^ 
Residing a t : (^s$>4s^{^t^i^J^T 
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BY: Robert D. Barclay 
Attorney for Petitioner 
533 26th Street, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Debbie D. Hall and 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, 
Petitioners, 
Vs. 
Jeffrey S. Kammersell 
Respondent. 
The undersigned, Judge of the District Court of the State of Utah, 
Weber County, HEREBY CERTIFIES: 
1. That a petition was verified by the above-named petitioner and 
was duly filed in this Court in the proceeding against the above-named 
respondent, commenced under the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act of the State of Utah (Utah Code Annotated, Section 
77-31-1, et seq.) to compel the support of the dependent(s) named in said 
petition. 
2. That the above-named respondent is believed to be residing at 
52 Watson Blvd., Pittsburgh, PA, and therefore, issuance and service of a 
summons upon the above-named respondent has been disposed with for the reason 
that the respondent is not a resident of the State of Utah, and is believed to 
be within the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, 
State of Pennsylvania. 
3. That according to the statement of the petitioner, the 
dependent(s) are in need of and entitled to support from respondent in the 
amount of $300.00 per month, to judgment in the amount of $5,240.00, for 
accrued and unpaid arrearages, and to an order that respondent make reasonable 
payments toward discharging that judgment. 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
Our Civil No. 78817 
Your Index No. 
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4. That in the opinion of the undersigned* the respondent should be 
compelled to answer such petition and be dealt with according to law. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that this certificate, together with 
three certified copies of the petition'be transmitted to the above-named Court 
believed to have jurisdiction over the respondent. 
Dated this 10th day of December
 t 19 85 . 
BY THE COURT: 
I.M.tfkA !.) H A L L 
.; is:, i I B L R I Y AOI-PUS 
ouDi.K'? U'I I;-- I Ah I- PO, 
JPPPRPY K A H f M L k ^ L L L 
j..;..).:^ ^ H R L O I P T . 
P I i r ^ B U k G M , P A i s m 
ORPLR 01 COURT 
I'll,i. NO. P P I P A I S ; ^ 
June ll _^ 
AHP NOW. l o - w i v . > t h i s - rncxKX^*. i v P P : . PABi. OP POPP i I .!:-.;; 0! MAY ,••-•• 
1 7 0 6 . P L A I N T I P RIXPRiXPPHTLD BY K . DURKIN. - 1XSU , , P P P P P D H P I P R P b P N i i W 
('OUR'I HP A k I N (.,... ORDPP 0! POPRJ P A T P O OP'IOBPR I P : :i PPP TO R P P / . i P I P 1.1 H . P ! . 
<•.'0 AR!•;IX AP' >.. I H 1 8 1 •:IX00hPLMI.)AT J. 0P P A!.)!.. P I T ! 10P I" !'KIX,JPi > I».;s- i O P L A I N I I P I 
! I I . I P O A P L ' ! ! ' ! JON FOR P O D l l I P A l X l O N I P IHIXRP ARP APPPOt-u I- p! ' i>PPPP I- OR PURR. 
PAYMEMV TO BL HA!.)IX T O ; Pi-BRA HALL C / « O P P I C E OF RPPOOlrKT :-PROTCtXi>/ W.<.\ 
X v , M ! p'j „ PUl'ITX 2 8 1 OBDFX.N.- U ; 8-<4('»1.M D O H I . S T I P PPPiYJ l O P P O K M C ' L "l O :X! P> 
P 0 1 ' Y 0 F T I ! (X 0 C T 0 BIX R 1. P >• 1 V a V. 01x 01R T 0 A B 0 " (X A 0 L) R E i> b .. 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLECHFW r n t m w 
C* C^ A-/ nTwmiM.1 CT^T? ///•iO/7A*,~.C*. ^-""5?"* 
C**« No. 
AND NOW, t o - v i t , th l« 
.,i*2Z 
^^~~?'~f< 'r ^ 
iVU^Ui^ 
